Gentrification and Xenophobia in the Gulf

Everyday, the Kuwaiti press publishes statements and reports coming from the interior ministry, meant to comfort their citizens: “We have arrested illegal immigrants” in this or that area, they say. These illegal immigrants were termed “illegal” once they left their employers, in an effort to escape exploitation, enslavement, sexual, physical and verbal abuse.

There is nothing groundbreaking in calling the migrant worker situation in the Gulf a clear example of modern slavery. State laws endow sponsors with complete control over the destinies of workers. This power granted to “citizens” necessarily produces corruption and the exploitation of others. To this very day, Gulf states fight against changing these unjust laws. They use cultural relativism to justify their resistance, saying, “Our traditions and religion do not allow us to let those housemaids live on their own!”

The issue of migrant workers in the Gulf is loaded with horrific stories of abuse and suicide, reported daily in the news. The way in which stories are reported, alone, stands as sufficient evidence of the racism and xenophobia that states practice, in their approach to migrant workers. They make sure to portray migrant workers as people at fault, or as ignorant and filthy, in order to deny audience sympathy and have it replaced with xenophobia.

There are numerous examples of reports in print and on TV that demonstrate the persecution of migrant workers in the Gulf. They are accused of abusing children and practicing “black magic” when, in reality, they are only victims of daily abuse. Saudi Arabia banned Indonesians, and Kuwait banned Bengalis. Why, do they say? Because they are too problematic; they object – they are not good slaves! Of course, that is not the official reason, because no official reasons are given.

Bahrain stands as a representative example of a country where this hate against migrant workers runs rampant. For Bahraini citizens, the first image that comes to mind at the mention of a migrant worker, is of someone who “looks” like they are from anywhere in South Asia.

In the Bahraini example, South Asians are either employed in the army, police and intelligence; or, they are underpaid workers with hard labor jobs. South Asians belonging to the law enforcement and military teams enflame xenophobic feelings among Bahrainis opposed to the regime and its political crimes; the hard laboring employees pay the price for this hate.

Some Bahrainis have spoken out about how migrant workers acted in sympathy with the citizens and how helpful they were, especially when the country was under emergency law in March 2011. However, this is not the picture that is promoted.

Several migrant workers have been killed in the last two years. Those opposing the current government accuse the regime of killing migrants in order to defame the revolution and provoke tensions, while the government accuses the “Shia” of taking revenge on the regime by killing workers.

Another example of xenophobia in the Gulf is afforded by the latest wave of gentrification in Kuwait. The Jleeb al-Shuyookh area is home to crime-filled ghettos, black market and expired food stalls, prostitution, residences of illegal workers, and so on. It is basically a workers’ escape from the unaffordable Kuwaiti hell. Kuwaitis have been calling for the demolition of this area because, it does not show off the country’s “civilized face.” They also want to use the land to build houses, since it is better placed on the map than many new and up-and-coming areas.

The Kuwaiti government is done waiting and has started the job; absolutely no one is speaking out against the demolition of this living space. Apparently, the so-called NGOs in and outside Kuwait do not see anything criminal in demolishing an entire area, specifically one where the working-class survive. The residents there often make less than 200 US dollars per month, have to support their families, and live with several others to secure housing. Now the state wants to pull them back into their Kuwaiti hell.

There is no escape, and they are expected to leave their jobs and live in-house with a master, as slaves. Civilization needs to be visible, everywhere; but only in concrete buildings, not in human rights.

* Published in AlAkhbar

Who Qualifies as a Human Rights Defender?

Three weeks ago, Emirati commentator Sultan al-Qassemi wrote a piece entitled, “UAE Political Islamists Are Not Defenders of Human Rights.” He criticized the way western NGOs and media outlets used the term “human rights defender” to describe certain jailed Islamists, most of whom were accused of being part of the United Arab Emirates’ wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qassemi spoke of a concern that many of us share: every time I see the term, I wonder how it can be so wrongly used and easily abused. There is much to say on the topic of how the media and NGOs employ the rhetoric of human rights.

Qassemi starts by showing how the UAE’s political Islamists are racist and sexist, which is easily apparent if you just follow their tweets; their tweets are often spontaneous and, so, must be somewhat reflective of their way of thinking. What also needs to be mentioned, however, is how much propaganda is directed against them from the Emirati media and in statements by state officials. The attacks on the Islamists, inside and outside of prisons, are oppressive and immoral; their families tell of denied prison visits, torture cases, and, lately, of how their bank accounts are being frozen just because they are relatives of Islamist detainees. Surely, this point is not to justify the thinking of certain political Islamists, but it is to highlight how state oppression becomes the deciding factor for NGOs on whether to include Islamists under the umbrella of human rights.

As someone that deals regularly with human rights organizations, I learned how inflexible they are in their work. Being forced to deal with stubborn regimes, NGOs often find themselves unable to speak about the violations again “regular people,” but, instead, must refer to any threatened voice as a human rights defender. I have seen how much easier it is to push NGOs to make statements about ‘activists’, as opposed to unknown protesters. NGOs feel forced to use the term ‘human rights defender’, even when the term does not fit, which has been the case, many times. If this speaks of anything, it speaks of our need to revisit a literature of criticism directed towards the discourse of ‘human rights.’ ‘Human Rights’ is ill, even in theory, as it creates a hierarchy, of who is in need of the most support, starting with political activists; that, by itself, makes it problematic and debatable.

What I find even more dangerous, is the way that NGOs in our region take it for granted that they must follow western organizations in their approaches. Local NGOs believe that, by abiding to this set of rules and established rhetoric, their work will be more relevant. They do not realize, however, the danger in following others in their dealings with particular cases. Why do we need to call an Islamist a human rights defender in order to demand his release? Why does ‘free speech’ need to be our top priority? Why do western NGOs need to, for example, call female circumcision a form of ‘torture’, to be able to criticize it? And who approved the act of including such a variety of Arab detainees under the umbrella of human rights, when our heritage consists of social, religious, and political doctrines where the ideal of justice is prevalent.

Starting this discussion is crucial; it can form a new consciousness for the way we perceive ‘human rights.’ It can, also, for the time being, alert NGOs to the need to change their policies and be more daring in criticizing state violations of any sort, without having to justify criticisms using the ‘rights’ discourse. The way ‘human rights’ has been used and overused in all of these contexts, and by passive bodies such as the United Nations, has simultaneously led to the normalization of violations and a game of finger-pointing. A reformed approach to human rights is needed.

* Published in AlAkhbar

Anonymous Twitter Account Leads Major Protests in Kuwait

After witnessing its biggest protest, the anonymous organizers of the “Dignity March” called for another one. Tens of thousands showed up in the areas of Mishref and Sabah Al-Salem protesting the Kuwaiti ruler's amendment of the voting law, which now allows a citizen to vote for one candidate instead of four. Protesters did not find the Amir's decree constitutional and believe the new law is made to play with the coming elections in December and to weaken the opposition that won most of the parliament's seats earlier this year. Like the previous march, Sunday's [Nov. 4, 2012] protest witnessed smoke and tear gas bombs and several arrests of protesters, who were later released.

* Continue reading this post in Global Voices

Kuwait’s Bahraini Scenario

Following the recent arrest of Kuwaiti opposition front man Musalam al-Barrak, one can only wonder what the authorities think they’re doing. Is this an act of political suicide for the small Gulf emirate, which has always bragged about its relative democracy? Barrak’s was not the first arrest of former opposition MPs on charges of defaming the Emir of Kuwait – an act criminalized by the country’s 1962 constitution.

This Tuesday, faced with charges of defaming the Emir, the authorities and the Kuwaiti Emirate, Barrak denied the accusations. On October 15, Barrak rocked Kuwait with a speech he gave at Erada Square in which he addressed the Emir directly. “We will not allow you,” he said addressing the head of the state. The sentence has become a slogan for the opposition; it was later used in social media campaigns and in the October 22 “Dignity March.” Such challenging statements have not been uttered against Kuwaiti authorities and, specifically, against the Emir since the Gulf War. The sentence marked a new phase in the opposition’s power struggle with the Emir – rather than just his cabinet.

Surely, the Kuwaiti opposition’s actions are often contradictory; they claim to protect the constitution, while failing to grasp that their salvation is not embedded in the text. The constitution technically ensures numerous rights that are violated by the authorities, as it still leaves space for censorship and restrictions against the government’s opponents. This inconsistency in the opposition’s performance and rhetoric is the strongest argument wielded against the opposition, not only by the authorities but also by loyal tribes, Shia and liberals.

But where can the authorities really go with these arrests? What comes next, after the arrest of the man who received the largest number of votes in the country’s history? Some Kuwaitis have been drawing comparisons between Kuwait and Bahrain, perhaps in an exaggerated manner. However, a Bahraini scenario is not too far-fetched at this very moment. If the authorities are choosing to provoke a power struggle solely to portray it as a clash between Saudi-rooted tribes and the ruling family, then this may well be Kuwait’s Bahraini scenario.

The tribes of Kuwait surely do not suffer the same level of discrimination as the Shia in Bahrain; they hold some positions of power and enjoy good historical relationships with the ruling family. In fact, after the latest protest, heads of the tribes met with the Emir to restate their loyalty to him. The tribes, however, are feared and discriminated against by the old-money class who wield power both in the economy and politics. The tribal movement is also empowered through its alliance with the Islamists and the support of an enthusiastic youth who are demanding more say by having an elected prime minister.

Earlier this year, the Emir responded well to opposition calls by dissolving parliament and replacing Prime Minister Nasser al-Mohammed, who was at the center of the clash between authorities and the opposition. Everyone believed that Kuwait was headed on the right path toward reforms. The opposition’s demands following their electoral victory in February were too stark; asking for ministers to be selected by a parliamentary majority was too threatening. In June, the crisis reached new heights when the Emir decided to suspend parliament for two months (another right afforded to him by the constitution). Later, the constitutional court inflamed the country with its decision to dissolve parliament amid claims that the procedures for dissolving the previous parliament were not performed legally.

The Kuwaiti authorities are simply failing to realize the dangerous implications of their actions; the more oppression they practice, the more power they grant to the opposition. The authorities are surely fearful of how far the opposition can go with its demands every time they’re permitted more space and dealt with diplomatically. Unfortunately, the authorities have made their choice already by making this a clash with tribes; it is the classical mentality of ‘divide and conquer.’

* published in AlAkhbar